FALL/WINTER 2026

Close Reading for Life: On Three Literary Virtues

Dan Sinykin

Art: Lotus, Miss Gough.

What is education for? Ye shall know them by their fruits. Education reproduces the status quo. K–12 provides students the education their wealth—through property taxes, tracking, or tuition—affords and sorts them accordingly. The wealthiest go to highly selective colleges and universities, which credential them to maintain their wealth. Whatever mobility higher education offers mostly happens at community colleges and regional publics—and the City University of New York, which has the highest mobility rate. Most poor and working-class students who enroll improve their standing, but without, in aggregate, affecting economic inequality. Education does less to change outcomes than to make society look meritocratic.

Presidents hope to raise money, fill seats, build things, and avoid a crisis. Trustees enforce these incentives, which drive capital campaigns, the recruitment of wealthy international students who pay full tuition, investments in athletics, administrative bloat, adjunctification, and the closure or diminishment of humanities programs. Finances are the base; learning—insofar as anybody cares about it—is something to speak about in a hollow cant that addresses every constituent and reaches none.

Students believe money matters most. They didn’t always. In 1970, they felt the most important thing to get from college was a meaningful philosophy of life. Ending up well off financially was eighth. When the poll ran in 2019, the goal students most often called essential was ending up well off financially. Developing a meaningful philosophy of life was eighth. Students have good reasons for the swap. In 1970, near the end of the postwar boom, one of the greatest periods in the history of capitalism, economic inequality had been greatly reduced. We’ve spent the last fifty years ramping back up to the Gilded Age.

Education is transactional. It is for credentials. Teachers feel this. The point of a course is the credit and the grade, required toward the degree. It is only because education has come to such a state that AI could create an existential crisis. Before AI, teachers could at least maintain the illusion that education is about learning. Students had to learn to get the credit and the grade. But because they were learning for the credit and the grade, they had no reason, other than the threat of punishment, not to supplant learning with AI. So it is. If not now, then soon, millions of students will submit AI-generated work to teachers who, many of them, will return AI-generated evaluations. Because education works to reproduce the status quo, we excise the substance: learning. 

Administrators accelerate the process. They sign contracts with AI companies for reasons that have little to do with learning: they do not want their school to fall behind; they want efficiency, and AI can rationalize and supplant labor; contracts are discounted by vendors hoping to hook a generation of future customers; and, as a matter of procurement rather than curriculum, contracts need no faculty consent. California State University paid OpenAI $16.9 million for eighteen months while individual campuses in the system were laying off dozens of faculty. 

We have two problems. I will not address the economic one. We ought to live in an egalitarian society where everyone has equal access to quality education. I instead address the pedagogical problem: the devolution of education to an instrument of human capital. Within education as it exists today, what can a teacher, standing in front of a classroom, meaningfully do? How should students act?

*

Aristotle taught a course about how to achieve the good life. It has come down to us in the form of a book called Nicomachean Ethics. He argues that every activity aims at some end. Law aims at justice. Medicine aims at health. It corrupts law and medicine to raise other ends, such as profit, above justice and health. Virtue names the quality that allows us to achieve an activity’s end. It is a matter of embodied character and requires habit, practice, training. Medicine includes many activities: counsel, diagnosis, surgery. Each has virtues that enable excellence. Pursuing excellence at diagnosis requires the acquisition of phronesis—practical wisdom—an adeptness at perceiving which detail among many matters in the case at hand. 

We might decide that some activities best reach their ends by technological supplementation; if in medicine a robot can facilitate health better than a doctor, then we would be wrong to refuse the robot. But with automation, practitioners lose the practice that forms them, that cultivates virtues, that keeps justice and health in human hands. Formation must happen somewhere on purpose. Education is the site of formation.

Some activities are good for their own sake. Games are like this: basketball, chess. Computers have long been better at chess than humans, but that has done nothing to diminish the good internal to playing chess, which is more popular than ever. 

Reading is like this, too. It is good for its own sake. It is also a—maybe the—foundational skill in education. Much of our trouble comes from failing to instill reading’s goodness because of its exigency. See: reading is hard. In the long history of our species, we learned to read extremely recently, just a few thousand years ago. To do so, we had to reconfigure our brains, which—as Stanislas Dehaene and Maryanne Wolf have argued—did not evolve for this, to make sense of written marks. Mass literacy, where most of a population can read, only emerged in the last century or two. It requires an immense collective effort. Adequately comprehending the text in front of you takes considerable training.

Close reading builds from a basis in comprehension to interpretation. And it traditionally takes as its object literature that wields language as a medium for art. These additions—the move from comprehension to interpretation, and the study of literature—make close reading extremely difficult. In fact, that difficulty is why we have close reading in the first place. A hundred years ago, a young lecturer at Cambridge, I. A. Richards, ran an experiment. He sent his students home with poems stripped of authors and titles and told them to bring them back annotated and analyzed. He discovered that his students not only struggled to interpret the poems, but that these high-achieving undergrads had trouble with basic comprehension. Dividing language into lines and pressing it toward aesthetic ends frustrates our ability to parse even its plain sense. In the wake of Richards’s revelations, which he published in 1929, scholars developed a technique for analyzing literature. Eventually that technique took the name “close reading.” 

Close reading is a practice that turns details into evidence for arguments, beautifully made, about what a text means and how it works. When we close read, we slow down, linger, revisit. We treat the object of our attention as art, not as content, or information, or as a set of facts to learn for some other purpose, though it makes us better at that, too. Like chess, it is good for its own sake. Like chess, it doesn’t matter if a computer can do it, even if it can do it better than us: we do it because it is good. Unlike chess, close reading in the classroom is assigned. A pedagogy of virtue asks us to do what we can to make our practices more chess-like: done with others, for the doing, with grading demoted.

We should, that is, be like Aristotle and teach the good life, which, since I haven’t just said it yet, is, for him, activity in accordance with virtue. Higher education ought to reclaim an old goal: bildung, self-cultivation. In fact, bildung is already educational policy among conservatives who champion what they call classical education and are building the institutions to make it happen. Great Hearts, for example, runs a network of schools whose purpose is “to cultivate the minds and hearts of students through the pursuit of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.” Classical education is entering universities through new civics centers—at Ohio State, the University of Iowa, the University of Florida, and elsewhere. Jennifer Berkshire, Bloch Lecturer in education at Yale, writes, “The right today has plenty of answers to the ‘why’ of education: patriotism, piety, virtue, ‘great books.’ But Democrats are still wedded to a vision of neoliberal school reform that reduces the entirety of schooling to job preparation.”

The greatest mistake we could make now is to leave virtue to conservatives. We can reclaim it as the justification for a pedagogy of human flourishing for all. It is crucial that such an education is not limited to elites, the wealthy, those who can pay for it—Aristotle’s unfortunate position—but is given to every student. As administrations proceed with neoliberalism, teachers must retain the freedom to govern their classrooms and choose virtue and intrinsic value over extrinsic, thin skills typically listed on syllabi as course outcomes.

Let’s persuade our students—and ourselves—that what we do is worth doing, not because it will help us make money, though we need to do that, but because we are going to die.

*

Accountability is the capacity to give an account of oneself and others to oneself and others. As a virtue, it descends from the ancient inscription on the Temple of Apollo at Delphi: know thyself. For Aristotle and Nietzsche, Alasdair MacIntyre and Judith Butler, we become reflexive subjects; we gain the capacity to think for ourselves, when we are asked to give an account of ourselves. Who are you? Why did you do that? Why do you think that? 

Accountability is an epistemological virtue. “Part of what it is for us to flourish is to be able to speak from ourselves and for ourselves,” writes philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear. “When I speak in the first person about my commitments, my beliefs and emotions, I must, if I am to flourish, be able to take myself into account. Otherwise, I cannot be truthful.” John Stuart Mill likewise argues that so long as we hold a belief second-hand, resistant to argument or challenge, we cannot call it truth. “Truth, thus held,” he writes, “is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.” We must know ourselves to know anything at all. 

Close reading asks for accountability three times over. We must be accountable to the text, to our experience of it, and to the person we address. To be accountable to a text, at minimum, means respecting what is there and what is not. To be robustly accountable, we must do justice to the text. The text addresses us; it tries to do something to us, to make us think or feel. We must try to make ourselves adequate to its address. If we are bored, we are failing—unless we’re watching Andy Warhol’s Sleep. We are ventriloquists; or method actors with the text as our background; or lawyers defending the text in court. We speak for it, we bring it to life, we defend it against accusations and misunderstandings.

Our account is also an account of ourselves. “That’s one of the things that close reading is,” write Jeff Dolven and Joshua Kotin, “a way of figuring out how to talk about how a poem makes you feel.” Close reading transforms hazy impressions into articulated convictions. A close reading is not a review, another genre in which we figure out how to talk about how a text makes us feel. In a review, we are more plainly evaluative. I liked this; that was terrible. How we feel about a text becomes evidence for how to understand what it means because a text’s meaning depends on how it makes us feel when we make ourselves adequate to its address.

We must be accountable to the person we address. Often that person, whether a teacher or a friend, will address us first to ask for our thoughts. Sometimes this means a teacher asks for an assignment, but close reading is not only a classroom practice. You go to a movie and on the way out, pushing through the doors, your friend asks, “What did you think?” You need to sort out all the burbling in your head, so you go to the bar and talk about it, argue about it; you grab hold of a scene, a gesture, when the actor did this, as a key that explains the whole thing: see how it connects to this and this and that? Accountability is a communicative virtue. To be accountable to an addressee means being sensitive to how they will receive us. It means accepting that our account, because of the sociality of genre, of language, is contestable by our addressee, that we are responsible for their contestation, to defend ourselves when we are right and to acknowledge when we are wrong and to strive to know the difference.

To be accountable is to be accountable to someone. The sociality of accountability means, as Butler emphasizes, that we depend on others who we can never fully know, in contexts we can never fully know, in language with norms that constrain and precede us; not to mention we live with “the non-narratable or even unspeakable dimensions of the unconscious that persist as an enabling foreignness at the heart of my desire.” We remain forever opaque to ourselves, and others continue addressing us, so the pursuit of accountability never ends.

Gentleness is a temporal virtue that patiently cultivates meaning from opacity. I come to the term “gentleness” through the French philosopher Anne Dufourmantelle, who, shortly before she died, helped with the completion of the translation into English of her book, Power of Gentleness: Meditations on the Risk of Living. She was a theorist of risk. She died risking her life to save two children struggling in the sea near Saint-Tropez in 2017. “Gentleness as power,” she writes, “determines the ripening of what is until then idle within the thing itself.” And: “Gentleness is a force of secret life-giving transformation linked to what the ancients called ‘potentiality.’” Gentleness flows from strength. It is a contested virtue, claimed for opposed ends by Homer and Jesus, Aristotle and Nietzsche. We live in a time when gentleness is disparaged. Dufourmantelle cautioned that “gentleness is sold to us under its diluted form of mawkishness. By infantilizing it, our era denies it.”

How can we be gentle with a text? Texts bear seeds of meaning. Ripening latent potential takes time; it does not rush. Gentleness coaxes it out. Gentleness trains us in temporal arts: endurance, patience. Ideas come late, in the shower, or once you’ve laid in bed and just gotten comfortable, or while walking. Ideas, that is, come once we quit pushing, once our minds yield. You’re reading and feel struck. You have a hunch that something more is there, in the detail that halted you, some secret key. Be gentle, tender, patient, soft. Reread. Read aloud. Return to the text later, and again later. Mention it to a friend. Give it time.

Gentleness is listening. Gentleness is softening your ego enough that you can hear the other. We criticize close readings when they impose the critic’s meaning, when the critic uses the text as a canvas for their own projection. Gentleness, in its openness, cultivates intimacy so that a text will tell you what it has to say. 

When we write, we merge our voice with the text’s; we sync our syntax and its, “composing sentences from sentences,” writes scholar Jonathan Kramnick, “working with materials that limit and shape what we may do with them, and thus learning and transmitting something about their specific nature.” Roughness ruins the effect, spotlights the seam. Gentleness lets the seam merely be the softly curved quotation marks hanging high, the words otherwise smoothly sliding from critic to text and back, a matter of care. Pace Kramnick, such stitching can easily deceive without the further work of hearing the text so as not to misrepresent its meaning, a deception that merged syntax facilitates, with its disclosure of specific nature, if we have rushed ahead without taking the time to receive the whole.

Gentleness is an ethical virtue. Accountability is epistemological. Before I get to sensibility, I am going to take a detour by way of Russia.

Viktor Shklovsky was twenty-three when he wrote “Art as Device.” It was 1916. He was serving in the army in St. Petersburg—Petrograd—after he was injured on the front. In western Ukraine, he had stoked a fire with pieces of a piano. There in Petrograd he served as an instructor for armored-car personnel. But now he could also be with his friends.

It was wartime but no matter. They were inspired by avant-gardes, ran with Futurists, scorned their professors, gave vivid talks at cafes, and carried on into the night at the home of Lilya and Osip Brik under the auspices of what they called the Society for the Study of Poetic Language. Shklovsky was the group’s enfant terrible, a graphomaniac and trickster who wrote in aphorisms, wrote to provoke, would reject the Bolsheviks, wrangle with Trotsky, go mute under Stalin, and manage to survive into the 1980s as a curious old man, strikingly bald, enjoying a small renaissance.

He is remembered, when he is remembered—anthologized, cited, taught—for “Art as Device,” published some months after he drafted it, in 1917. Specifically, he is remembered for a passage where he says what art is for. “Routine actions become automatic,” he wrote. Our sensorium is blunted by habit. And then:

Automatization eats things, clothes, furniture, your wife, and the fear of war. “If the complex lives of people go on unconsciously, then it is as if they had never been.” And so, what we call art exists to give back the sensation of life, to make us feel things, to make the stone stony. The goal of art is to create the sensation of seeing, and not merely recognizing, things; the device of art is the “ostranenie” of things and the complication of the form, which increases the duration and complexity of perception, as the process of perception is its own end in art and must be prolonged. 

Ostranenie became a slogan of modernism. Defamiliarize. Estrange. Make the stone stony. I am rarely astonished like I once was. It feels like an erosion of aging. A peregrine falcon squats on a branch outside my house as if holding watch. Lydia Davis writes a very short story in her surgical deadpan about a mother who tells her daughter to sleep in a hole in the ground forever. I know, as a light tickling at something asleep inside me, that I ought to be astonished. Instead, if I linger over the falcon or Davis at all, it is to explain: Atlanta is a city where falcons live; Davis uses compression, exaggeration, and irony to express repressed emotion. Instances become types, phenomena taken care of by reason. My daughter, in the bath, is astonished by the plop made by bath crayons when she drops them in the water and the pffft that follows from their splash; she looks at me in conspiracy, as if I must be astonished, too. The stars, the president’s crimes, my wife alight in brown overalls. Shklovsky already saw that routine eats even your wife, the fear of war. What is astonishing is that he still believed that art might astonish, bring it all back.

By sensibility I mean the sensitivity of our sensorium. It is an aesthetic virtue and “aesthetics,” writes Frank Sibley, is a matter of “perception.” “People have to see the grace or unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music, notice the gaudiness of the color scheme, feel the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone.” Unless they perceive these qualities “for themselves, aesthetic enjoyment, appreciation, and judgment are beyond them.”

Sensibility as a term of art dates at least to the mid-eighteenth century when it was theorized by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith as a delicacy of imagination cultivated through practice, enabling aesthetic appreciation and moral sympathy. For T. S. Eliot, such scholarship was already belated. “In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered,” he wrote. He was praising the metaphysical poets who united mind and body, sense and sensibility, who could feel thought “as immediately as the odor of a rose.” By the end of the eighteenth century, Mary Wollstonecraft criticized the cult of sensibility for its gendered division, with novels and poetry keeping women from reason and making them “prey of their senses,” cultivating in them an “over exercised” or “overstretched” sensibility. Jane Austen’s novel, to which I have alluded, published twenty years after A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, suggests, through Elinor and Marianne Dashwood, a more hopeful synthesis.

Other modernists shared Eliot’s insistence on sensibility. Joseph Conrad argued that literature must “make its appeal through the senses.” “It must,” he wrote, “strenuously aspire to the plasticity of sculpture, to the color of painting, and to the magic suggestiveness of music.” He went so far as to say such aspirational aestheticism was “the only valid justification for the worker in prose.” Henry James wrote that the novelist “competes with his brother the painter, in his attempt to render the look of things, the look that conveys their meaning, to catch the color, the relief, the expression, the surface, the substance of the human spectacle.”

In the wake of Conrad and James, and contemporaneous with Eliot, I. A. Richards conducted his experiment to see what his students understood about poems. He was alarmed to find they lacked “sensuous apprehension.” “Words in sequence have a form to the mind’s ear and the mind’s tongue and larynx,” he wrote. We see a painting with our eyes, we hear music with our ears, we do not feel a novel with our hands, not in the same way. And yet, Conrad thinks the novelist should aspire to the plasticity of sculpture. James thinks the novelist can compete with the painter. Richards brings forth the problem when he writes mind’s ear, mind’s tongue and larynx. What does it really mean to experience literature with our senses?

Elaine Scarry observes that “unlike painting, music, sculpture, theater, and film,” the verbal arts “are almost wholly devoid of actual sensory content.” Literature’s “visual features,” she writes, “consist of monotonous small black marks on a white page. It has no acoustical features. Its tactile features are limited to the weight of its pages, their smooth surfaces, and their exquisitely thin edges.” Yet. Typically our imagination is poor at imitating perception. If you close your eyes and imagine someone very close to you, your mother, a lover, you will probably only be able to do so faintly. And so, writes Scarry, “it is a remarkable fact that this ordinary enfeeblement of images has a striking exception in the verbal arts, where images somehow do acquire the vivacity of perceptual objects.” Nabokov instructs that to be a good reader, “We must see things and hear things, we must visualize the rooms, the clothes, the manners of an author’s people. The color of Fanny Price’s eyes in Mansfield Park and the furnishing of her cold little room are important.”

Do you remember hearing the “Chuck. Chuck. Chuck.” of Cash’s adze as he builds Addie’s coffin? Did you “Squeeze! Squeeze! Squeeze!” that sperm with Ishmael as the globules “richly broke” and “discharged all their opulence, like fully ripe grapes their wine”? When Leopold Bloom ate “grilled mutton kidneys,” did you, too, enjoy the “fine tang of faintly scented urine”? Can you see the birthmark above Sula’s eye, whether a stemmed rose, a copperhead, or tadpole, or the chokecherry tree on Sethe’s back, a scar that, as Kimberly Juanita Brown writes, “conceals and reveals all at once,” making her “vulnerable and open to reading”?

When I was seventeen, I was blown to smithereens by a six-word sentence. A screaming comes across the sky. Iambic tetrameter, folksy, like Robert Frost, bringing death. It opens Gravity’s Rainbow onto a scene of “Evacuation,” a train leaving the city in the lightless dark of night. Pirate Prentice feels “metal nearer and farther rub and connect, steam escaping in puffs, a vibration in the carriage’s frame.” He smells “coal from days far to the past.” He wakes from this apocalyptic dream to London in 1944, the sight of a vapor trail on the horizon bringing another German V-2 rocket. Was that what screamed across the sky? What did I hear? What did Prentice hear in his dream? Is sensing while dreaming like sensing while reading? 

It was a rocket. But if I heard it, then the Evacuation was, as the narrator notes, “too late,” “all theatre.” Because the V-2 travels faster than sound. If you hear it, it’s already hit. And yet also in the dream everyone is going to die, “there is no way out,” the rocket is still coming, “screaming holds across the sky.” “When it comes,” the narrator asks, “will it come in darkness, or will it bring its own light? Will the light come before or after?”

The senses, that is, have gone all screwy. The novel’s protagonist, so far as there is one, is Tyrone Slothrop, who, thanks to psychological experiments undergone as an infant, anticipates the site of rocket strikes with his erections. A center for psychological warfare, “The White Visitation,” investigates extrasensory perception and the paranormal. We might say that Gravity’s Rainbow is about how technology and the human sciences have distorted the sensorium of the human animal and left us disoriented.

A screaming comes across the sky. If you went in knowing nothing about the novel, as I first did, what would you hear? A siren? An eagle? A jet? Maybe I tried each of these with my inner ear. Beings scream. People scream. If it’s inanimate it’s catechresis. Whatever it is, “it has happened before,” the narrator says, “but there is nothing to compare it to now.” It is both a repetition and unique. I read ahead and came back and read the sentence again. A screaming comes across the sky. I did this over and over. With close reading, I learned that I was hearing the impossible sound of a rocket that hasn’t come, yet had to have come. And yet here, in my inner ear, I heard it. I hear it still: the catechretic screaming, an inanimate voice that scrambles chronology.

Hearing the impossible is one trick of what Lucía Martínez Valdivia calls “audiation.” We tend to privilege sight. The term we use for cognitive perception of all the senses, imagination, is visual. Scholars have, with little recourse, called on the auditory imagination. Robert Frost invokes “the imagining ear.” Valdivia names audiation as “the sonic, aural equivalent of imagination,” and uses the term “to facilitate a focus on the mental soundscapes text can convey, on the range of nonlexical and nonvocal sounds written language can communicate, on its capacity to create mental experiences of sound that exceed the possibilities of physical speech and even the acoustic worlds available to our physical senses.” Milton, she argues, for example, transports us to hear the heavenly music of the crystal spheres. 

Sensibility, then, when reading, offers a peculiar sort of sensitivity to our sensorium: sensitivity, really, to our cognitive sensorium.

I have bracketed quite a lot in the account of reading I have given. Poetry’s lineation and rhythm, for example, foreground the materiality of language: the look on the page, the uttered sound of words. A screaming comes across the sky is iambic tetrameter. When I was a graduate student, in the fall of 2010, more than eighty years after the publication of Richards’s Practical Criticism, I listened to a lecture by his student, and Pynchon’s professor, M. H. Abrams, then ninety-eight years old, gave a lecture about the physical act of enunciation, which he called “the fourth dimension of a poem,” which he argued is essential to the full understanding of literature. Many of us listen to audiobooks. Graphic novels integrate visual and verbal art. Scarry dismisses too quickly the aesthetic qualities of the book as a physical object. I have a three-year-old, so I know how children’s books at times aim to activate all the senses. 

I, for my part, am learning to read again. I first learned to decipher signs when I was five or six with the help of Theodore Geisel, or Dr. Seuss. He taught me what fun it can be to play with words, to take and make and break words. I learned again at seventeen with Gravity’s Rainbow. It was fall of my senior year. I hurried home from school to read it and reread it, training myself to attend to every word. I couldn’t believe you could do what he did with language. I learned to read again in grad school—I learned to read by triage, to scan an introduction, skim an article, swipe my eyes quickly across archival documents, to read for secrets and lies and messages humming at the lower frequencies. Somewhere along the way I lost my body. 

*

“The paradox and scandal of the human condition,” writes Pierre Hadot, “man lives in the world without perceiving the world.” Hadot was a scholar of ancient philosophy. His great contribution was to argue that the Cynics and Epicureans and Platonists and Stoics were not building bodies of thought; they were not engaged in abstract thought as we tend to think of philosophy today, but rather they were practicing spiritual exercises. Inspired by Hadot, Michel Foucault, late in his life, took up an interest in ancient philosophy and what he called “care for the self.” Hadot worried that Foucault distorted the Stoics by focusing too exclusively on the self. “The psychic content of these exercises seems to me to be something else entirely,” he wrote. “In my view, the feeling of belonging to a whole is an essential element: belonging, that is, both to the whole constituted by the human community, and to that constituted by the cosmic whole.” Hadot believed that in our time it is “the experience of modern art” that “allows us to glimpse” “the miracle of perception itself,” and “when we do so,” he wrote, “we are astonished by it.”

About 2400 years ago, Plato wrote a dialogue known as the “Phaedrus.” In it, Socrates presents an argument against what he sees as a threatening linguistic technology that will harm human well-being, which is to say: writing. The Egyptian god Theuth claimed it would enhance our memories, but Thamus replied that by externalizing our memories we would become forgetful. Socrates agrees, as does, we infer, Plato, his method of communicating with us notwithstanding.

Faced with the threat of this linguistic technology, what did Plato do? He founded a school, the Academy. It lasted for hundreds of years. It taught its students how to live.